Superpower Politics: America on Assignment

By: Leroy A. Binns Ph.D.

America’ ascension to hegemonic heights following the disintegration of the Soviet empire is psychologically challenged at a critical juncture. The historic events of 9/11 that beckoned for a pro-active political course of action and stewardship has reshaped US foreign policy and tainted the Bush administration’s notion of crisis intervention and democracy.

US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq emphasized both multi and unilateral approaches at work. In reaction to al Qaeda’s attack on American soil the White House attained accolades for coordinating a joint effort that dislodged the Taliban establishment and sent both parties into hiding. Nonetheless at odds with the spirit of Kosovo the administration’s conflicting behavior towards Iraq under the presumption of fear and an unwillingness to pursue diplomacy as recommended by the international community eroded a sense of trust in the Republican guard. The misinterpretation of intelligence information upon which a strike was predicated, fragmentation between the US and vital global partners and an unexpected quagmire that degenerates with time underscores a contradiction in the execution of foreign policy demonstrated by both instances and henceforth advances the question, When is it appropriate for a sovereign nation to forego compliance with the Treaty of Westphalia and resort to pre-emption against another?

History recalls Britain’s failure to respond to advice from General Mason McFarland regarding the imminent threat posed by Hitler and the Third Reich. Ignorance may also be at fault for the acceptance of the Bolshevik’s platform of classical socialism which was subsequently reversed by Stalin’s reign of terror and for the reluctance to respond decisively to early signs of terrorism thus establishing a rationale for impulsive conduct.

Although confronting a difference in inheritance – a scared inspired enemy without geographical confines and mostly unknown as opposed to a typical unit with expansive designs and capabilities the president’s reaction to terrorism mirrors that of pioneer president Harry Truman. In pursuit of semblance of a new world order the Commander in Chief like his predecessor is of the conviction that his election to center stage enables him a platform to rid the world of divisiveness with the institutionalization of democracy and market economics. Yet he overlooks the relevance of partnerships exhibited throughout the Truman era.

Mistakenly the Bush doctrine of independence is reminiscent of congressional battles waged by the Senate Majority Leader Robert Taft and company protesting the deployment of American troops in Europe and the purpose of a trio of supranational entities – NATO, the World Bank and the UN. Crusaders of the “do it alone” philosophy the likes of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield, Secretary of State Condolezza Rice and former Director of Policy Planning Richard Haas attest to a matter of expediency unlike any other and steadfastly resort to infamous pronouncements in defense of their assault.

“the mission will define the coalition rather than the coalition define the mission – Rumsfield

“before you see smoking a gun you may see a smoking mushroom” – Rice

“this is not pure unilateralism but multilateralism a la carte” – Haas

With intolerance for contrasting perspectives or caution the “with us or against us” campaign ignored reservations by the revered former Secretary of State Colin Powell but conversely appeased neo-conservatives such as Vice President Richard Cheney and Chairman of the World Bank Paul Wolfowitz whose endorsements of aggression were rationalized as detrimental to US national security and universal stability. In fact in a reversal of sorts Powell became the torch bearer who inadvertently presented deceptive documentation to the UN for collective consent to engage Iraq.

Upon close scrutiny the president’s discharge of foreign policy is ambiguous. In spite a loss of 30% of Central Europe’s population attributed to the Thirty Year war and the adoption of subsequent preventative measures to ensure noninterference across state borders a shift in focus in providing the necessary resources to demolish an elusive enemy has elevated an unwarranted intrusion in Iraq. Such infraction later legitimized as a precursor to egalitarianism compromises the premise of protectorate ascribed to America by Niall Ferguson in “Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire” on the grounds of merits as both president and academic equate the application of uni-polar activity with the maintenance of peace and freedom.

While few question America’s military prowess a debate is ongoing about her intent and the need for consensus building and diplomacy. In “Sorrows of an Empire” Chalmers Johnson’s analysis of US behavior laments missed opportunities of governance overshadowed by an air of superiority via a self-serving defense complex during an age of Islamic fundamentalism. Johnson along with Rutgers University’s political science scholar Benjamin Barber denounces the administration’s misconception of the role of global interdependence and the character of democracy. Furthermore the latter cites illustrations of complexities and interrelations in justifying a conversion to cosmopolitan management.

The evolution of local dissent to American intervention in Iraq signals the need for cooperation and compromise on matters of overarching consequence. In a 2003 Zogby poll of 1,000 randomly selected individuals nationwide, 60% acknowledged concern for America as an imperial power acting alone while two-thirds showed preference for foreign policy that seeks multilateralism and international cooperation. With dismal results the president’s approval on global leadership plummets.

The following are surveys conducted by Fox News in 9/05 and USA Today/Gallup in 06

On the Iraq invasion

How are things going for the US in Iraq?

 8% better than expected

35% as well as can be expected

52% worse than expected

 

Bush handling Iraq?

41% approve

55% disapprove

 

What should US troops in Iraq do?

 33% come home now

58% finish the job?

 

In the long run will Iraq turn out well for the US?

33% turn out well

46% turn out badly

12% mixed

 

The president’s overall rating

Jan 12              43%

Feb                  39%

Mar                  36%

April                34%

May                 31%

General confirmation on shared responsibility gained traction with the erosion of America’s marketability, the emergence and visibility of global networks and an overburdened treasury. A one-time overwhelming advantage sustained through generated output by leading industries such as automobiles and chemical and electrical machinery has been subjected to fierce competition and is currently undergoing a structural transformation to acquire efficiency within a global arena of commerce. A decline in US economic influence since 1950 is measured by a decreasing GDP which fell from 27% of the world’s GDP in 1950 to 21 in 1998 partly at the expense of Japan with an increasing share of 5% during the same timeframe. Moreover America’s share of manufactured exports diminished from 13% to 10.8% between 1980 and 2003 as a result of dependency commonly associated with a large trade deficit and excessive spending.

The downward cycle also includes the emergence and strength of foreign multinational corporations with US cross border mergers and acquisitions declining from 75% between 1987 and 1990 to 48% between 2001 and 2003 and a reduction of 13% in output foreign direct investment between the years 1980 and 2003. Of equal deliberation is a lack of confidence in US capital markets. Albeit the value of shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ increased by 15% over a ten year period (1993-2003 America’s share of international banking has in contrast decreased from 11% in 1993 to 7% in 2004.

Acuteness of Washington’s financial woes extends to a massive tax reduction program of $350 billion in anticipation of monetary stimulation, a sizable budget of $2.8 trillion and a deficit of $400 billion in fiscal year 2006 approximately 3% of the country’s yearly economic output

Budget Changes – as a percentage of US gross domestic product during the following administrations

Roosevelt                              14.8%

Truman                                    -8.6%

Eisenhower                              -1.3%

Kennedy                                    0.2%

Johnson                                        1%

Nixon                                        1.6%

Ford                                         -1.4%

Carter                                        1.8%

Reagan                                     -0.6%

G. Bush                                     0.2%

Clinton                                  -1.8%

G. W. Bush                                2.4%

 

How the presidents compare on spending

Overall federal spending                                                          Defense

Johnson                       6%                                                        5%

Nixon – Ford               3%                                                       -6%

Carter                           4%                                                       3%

Reagan                         3%                                                       4%

G. Bush                        2%                                                      -4%

Clinton                       2%                                                      -2%

G. W. Bush                  5%                                                        8%

Note: All figures have been adjusted for inflation

As the president submits a wartime supplemental appropriations request of $74.7 billion to Congress for funding the Iraq conflict and the global war on terror his attention is not lost on Iran and North Korea. To prevent the two remaining member of “the axis of evil” from possessing nuclear expertise Washington is pressuring a defiant Iran to halt the alleged use of reactors to enrich uranium to atomic specifications while chastising an isolated Korea for admitting to nuclear capacity. In the case of the former a negotiation process is underway with the European Union to offset sanctions by the UN Security Council whereas the Asian crisis is being simultaneously addressed in a comparable fashion by a consortium of six comprised of North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States of America.

With the restless participants objecting to overtures on grounds of ethical usage of neutron properties the stalemate enters a critical phase. At stake is the integrity of negotiating partners but most importantly political and economic stability in the Middle East and Asia. An infusion of militarism could ignite retaliation leading to an Iraq/Israeli conflict that could extend to Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region. Such would have far reaching connotations in relation to the Palestinian/Israeli dispute and ferment increased hostility towards America by Islamic elements. The “fall out” of such reckless deportment would also provoke an economic catastrophe at home as speculations and possible shortage of crude oil would affect consumer spending and erode confidence in the economy.

Of less likelihood is a similar solution with North Korea as such could be utilized as a catalyst for intrusion in South Korea while gravely disrupting tranquility in Japan and a much needed market in China. Furthermore such provocation would encourage the Chinese establishment to adopt a protective regime within its sphere of influence thus rekindling the cold war.

The scenarios aforementioned are conceivable and must be deterred at all cost.  While a blend of penalties and incentives is worthy of examination the implication of both will ultimately determine the nature of the outcome. Thus the infliction of punishment while restrictive must bear elements of flexibility and an offering of incentives should be void of mistrust and therefore incorporate a respectable balance between all parties involved. Washington must also reconsider its stance on non-aggression treaties and bilateral negotiations with Tehran and P’yongyang.

As an outpour of allegiance on issues from global climatic change to poverty undercuts our sense of community and commitment to demonstrate democratic principles the US must re-evaluate its political hypothesis if expected to remain a viable agent of change. A world influenced by conflicting points of views requires a long term strategy of cultural and educational exchanges to advance civil society.