A New Yugoslavia

By: Leroy A. Binns Ph.D.

The post Tito and Soviet eras have given voice to ethnic pronouncements and new political and economic engines. However the path to democracy and prosperity in Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia is marred with internal complications.

Serbia-Montenegro

Despite the lengthy passage of time since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the inevitable demise of multiethnic Yugoslavia thereafter the government of President Slobodan Milosevic has failed to deliver on its promises of stability and success. Subsequent to the Dayton Accords in 1995 which led to concessions regarding a Greater Serbia and rewards namely the removal of a four year old international sanction that crippled the Serbian economy Milosevic presided over a corrupt system steeped in racism and nepotism. As the gap between wealth and poverty widened so did resentment. In 1996 tens of thousands of people lined the streets of Belgrade to contest the government’s attempts to manipulate local elections – a scene repeated four years later in retaliation to Belgrade’s interpretation of the 2000 presidential election. The international community also sought to restrict government’s authority as demonstrated by its response to the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and the general elections of 2000.

A partnership between local activists and foreign arbitrators has culminated with the demise of the Milosevic empire and his extradition to the Hague on charges of human atrocities. It is also in part responsible for glimpses of democracy at play. Nevertheless an allegiance to elements of the past in contrast with a selection of choices at the ballot box is redefining the nature of the electoral process and its outcome.

Under the stewardship of President Vojislov Kostunica, the Socialist Party of Serbia was replaced by an alliance with Serbia’s Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and the Democratic Party. This honeymoon nonetheless was short-lived as political stalemate on rehabilitation programs became the order of the day. At odds were the nationalist and pragmatic ideologies of Kostunica and Djindjic resulting in the former’s withdrawal from policy meetings with the intent to instigate an early referendum to eject the latter.

In response to apathy and disillusionment a compromise was formalized in the form of the 2003 constitutional charter and an accommodation of a change in identification from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Serbia-Montenegro plus the introduction of a diluted commonwealth with the transfer of federal functions to republics became official. Yet the endorsement of modern market reform coupled with reintegration with the IMF, World Bank and European counterparts leave a lot to be desired – a metamorphosis of a mismanaged economy illuminated by an extended period of sanctions and damaged infrastructure depreciated by 50% over a ten year period (1990-2000) of which the protected province of Kosovo prominent for an Albanian/Serbian rivalry remains Europe’s poorest region with an annual economic output less than $500 per person. The assassination of Djindjic likewise posed additional concerns pertinent to security and political stability.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia declared sovereignty and independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992 respectively and to its merit amid resistance by Bosnian Serbs and neighboring Serbia gained its objective with the creation of the joint Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an entity later concretized by the signing of the 1995 Dayton Accords.

Like its poverty stricken sister Macedonia, this poor republic sought resolve through democracy. To that end a tri-partite presidency of Zivko Radisic, Ante Jelavic and Alija Izetbegovic was replaced with moderate governance charged with the responsibility of reflecting proportional representation but not without consequences. A coalition such as the Alliance for Change with a marginal majority left the opposition in contention as was evident with the re-election of Jelavic as president of the Bosnian-Croat HDZ and oftentimes the preclusion the passage of legislation and appointments. Case in point is a divided establishment compliments of a government bureaucracy that is unique in configuration and differs in political orientation from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Republika Srpska unable to redress a fragmented internal security force and replace or minimize the burden of protection placed upon the UN and NATO. Moreover evidence involves the House of Representatives’ inability in February 2001 to appoint the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina the chairman of the council of ministers.

The country’s fragile state of affairs transcends matters of security. Such has been likewise afflicted by economic implications. Amidst domestic conflict which discredits the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace an artificial economy sustained by foreign assistance and the black market competes with massive migration and the destruction of industries and the port facilities on the Sava River. Tales of high unemployment and inflation (at 50% in 2000) and a decreasing gross national product and gross domestic product are also equal parties in this paralysis. In fact in 1999 the GDP was far below its 1990 levels.

Revitalization requires a unifying theme that is consistent with the interest of this diverse nation and a carefully supervised influx of capital to bolster state institutions and the creation of jobs. Germany’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has argued for a Marshall Plan for the region - the extension of a decade long endeavor of $5.1 billion by the international community. This overwhelming task of humanity that could entail the utilization of foreign administers as suggested by the head of the international authorities in Bosnia Wolfgang Petritsch now awaits implementation and tangible results.

Croatia

Like Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatia once embroiled in an historic crisis between Serbs and Croats found some resolution through a secret pact signed by Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman on the definitive dissolution of former Yugoslavia in return for territorial integrity. Other similarities were also characterized through intentions of Tudjman who like Milosevic sought to preside over a presidential state. However with his party lacking a two-thirds majority he reluctantly acquiesced sharing power with the prime minister.

The path to Croatian nationalism on some fronts differed from that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whereas communist attitudes crippled the latter’s economy Tudjman’s romantic post-communist nationalist approach yielded some positive outcomes. In spite of a war economy which engulfed 40% of public spending until 1996 and decreased GDP by 40% and industrial production by 50% in the four years following the dismantling of Yugoslavia economic hardship was countered by the introduction of government programs between 1993 and 1996 that lowered inflation rates from 1,500% to 3.5% and ignited tourism in Dalmatia thus providing valuable foreign exchange.

A nationalist agenda nonetheless described by the Economist as “an over concentration of political power, an economic recession, international isolation and widespread popular distrust of the governing class” coupled with numerous labor disputes, social unrest and unemployment at approximately 20% in 1996 signaled the need for swift change – an objective that became a reality with the passing of Tudjman in 1999. With the political pendulum changing directions from the Croatian Democratic Union and its large state sector in favor of new management in the form of an alliance between the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals and its expansive platform of privatization and international integration expectations abound.

Both President Stipe Mesic and Prime Minister Ivica Racan vowed to rise beyond semantics and superficial tendencies. In an interview with the German weekly Der Spiegel the former express Croatia’s commitment to Western values and institutions as a contribution to peace and prosperity at home whereas his subordinate pledged to “depoliticize the organs of the state which has been bastions of nationalist party support for the past decade.” Nevertheless three years later the formula which is also inclusive of establishing trade agreement and rectifying migration and border disputes in the Balkans while concurrently gaining consideration on the European stage has encountered mixed reviews.

In the absence of a jubilee accompanied by a highly publicized pending election slated for the 23^rd of November 2003 a Globus opinion poll revealed a substantial level of dissatisfaction among Croat voters with 60% disenchanted with the government performance. Croat must confront a formal banking sector riddled with severe problems and synchronously address democratization and issues of civil liberty. Improved relations within the Balkans and access to European and Trans Atlantic institutions are likewise matters of significance to the country’s development.

Macedonia

This republic celebrated its independence on the 8^th of September 1991 and adopted a parliamentary system consisting of a president tenured for five years and a single chamber assembly to which members are elected to four year terms. Thus far the democratic process has yielded elections in 1995 and 1999 but this multiethnic entity of fragile institutions comprised of 66% Macedonians and approximately 25% Albanians struggles with the memories of 2001 Albanians extremist attack near Skopje and Tetovo and unpredictability surrounding the spirit of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and a market economy.

With a relatively large state owned sector hovering at 45% of total GDP and partly accountable for a weak economy the leadership is required to reverse a 40% unemployment rate and eliminate the black market. The magnitude of the problem rest with insecure commercial and financial systems that attract low investor confidence and therefore as indicated by official documentation the lowest per capita and foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe through 1999.

The Kosovo conflict depicts an intrinsic link between the Macedonian economy and external events. With the state’s reliance on Serbia as a source for market and a transportation corridor the aforementioned disruption terminated business and heightened joblessness affecting the country’s GDP by 30%. Although the country gains a nod of approval from USAID on macroeconomic stability and fiscal assistance ($28 million in 1999) its incapability to provide basic service to a growing underprivileged citizenry has fueled illegal activities estimated at 40% of its GDP the equivalent of $1.2 billion per annum accompanied by deadly repercussions.

Currently the government of Boris Trajkovski takes credit for economic reform notably

free trade, regional integration and foreign intervention as observed through Greek collaboration in banking,  infrastructure and telecommunication but must control inflation while simultaneously while accommodating the essential needs of several ethnic communities incorporative of refugee enclaves.

Slovenia

Political transformation is not lost on Slovenia as she too has engineered a multiparty democratic model. However unlike her sister states this nation has achieved commendation for a stable democracy characterized by regular elections, a free press and a remarkable human rights record.

An illustration of consistency relates to Milan Kucan who acquired the role of president in 1990 led the country to independence the year after and was re-elected to said position in 1992 and 1997 by a comfortable margin. Continuity was also visible with the return of Prime Minister Janez Drmovsek to another term in office in the 2000 parliamentary elections.

Beyond a solid foundation comprised of political institutions and processes and an amalgamation of peoples of varied ethnicities and origin is the experience of economic influence. Privatization is almost completed and trading with the European community which accounted for 66% and 75% of total commercial transactions in 2000 and 2002 respectively has diversified and increased thus limiting unemployment to 11% by 2002. Other positive indicators of a strong economy are a controlled inflation rate at 8.9% in 2000 and a boost in GDP by 3% in 2003.

Within the international arena Slovenia has become the trendsetter. In 1996 she signed an association membership with the European Union and is an associate to the Central European Free Trade Agreement as well as over 40 international organizations among them the World Trade Organization. Equally significant is a two year period ranging from 1998 to 2000 during which she occupied a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Slovenia’s exemplary performance hinges on ongoing fiscal reform yoked with perestroika – a true stimulant to continued foreign investment.

Conclusion

Albeit at distinguishable stages of their development the components for good fortune remain the same. The establishment of democracy must be embraced by civil society and fiscally oriented to proportionately benefit an assorted citizenry.